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Abstract: European political leaderships have responded to the emergence of global 
finance by a sustained drive to integrate Europe’s own financial systems on the basis 
of a switch from classical bank credit to tradable securities. In itself, this was a 
rational response. However, financial integration was pursued at breakneck speed and 
in disregard of important public goods  including economic stability and social 
justice. Reforms were undertaken in a climate of moral panic, in the false belief that 
the EU faced a serious problem of external competitiveness. In consequence, 
Europe’s banks and institutional investors were badly exposed to the sub-prime crisis, 
the eurozone has been radically disorganised and the EU has had little influence on 
the evolution of global financial structures and practices. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The last fifteen years have seen the complete subordination of European finance to the 
globalised US financial system. This shift was supported enthusiastically by both 
political and corporate leaderships. Its consequences are firstly that European finance 
was as heavily implicated in credit crisis as was American finance and secondly that 
the Europeans are at a disadvantage in formulating a response to the crisis.  
 
This does not mean that the Europeans were wrong to integrate and open their 
financial systems. The development of a global financial system posed a challenge 
that could not be met by the fragmented, particularist, national and regional systems 
of the past. However, the integration and liberalisation measures adopted by the 
Europeans were simplistic and reckless. The aim was simply to reduce financial 
transactions costs as quickly as possible. In pursuit of this objective virtually every 
aspect of social control was compromised. 
 
The rest of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 characterises the 
transformation of finance in the largest EU economy, that of Germany. This is only 
the most important example of a process which took place in all member states. In 
section 3 the account moves to the EU level: the background to EU financial policies 
was the Lisbon strategy which can be seen as resulting from a moral panic and as 
launching an attempt at breakneck Americanisation – especially in the financial 
sphere. Section 4 considers the EU’s financial integration strategy in more detail and 
section 5 looks at the efforts of the Commission to introduce a sub-prime mortgage 
market in Europe – only the outbreak of the US sub-prime crisis put an end to this 
project. Section 6 recounts one consequence of the European policies – the fact that 
EU banks are even more exposed to the crisis than were their US counterparts. 
Section 7 relates financial developments to the persistent macroeconomic 
malfunctions of the eurozone; real estate bubbles and other speculative inflows into 
countries with big current account deficits delayed, while exacerbating an open crisis 
of the monetary union. Section 8 presents some very recent developments and section 
9 concludes..      
 
 
2. The Americanisation of German Finance 
 
In the 1990s virtually every member state government in the EU decided to complete 
the liberalisation of its financial sector and to promote the development of its security 
markets. The most significant of these moves was in Germany where it involved the 
dismantlement of a complex financial system centred on bank credit.  
   
An important step in the abandonment of Germany’s stakeholder financial system, 
with concentrated holdings, inter-firm linkages and the role of the banks as 
shareholders, was the abolition, by the Schröder government, of capital gains tax on 
the cross-holdings of equity by German banks and other corporations. This was to 
prepare the way for the dissolution of Deutschland AG (see Streeck and Höpner  
2003).  
 
Data on actual ownership structures may overestimate the continuity of German 
finance: even before shares are disposed of, a bank might start to regard them as 
components of a portfolio rather than as supports for a long-term involvement in the 
enterprise concerned. 
 
The long-standing complaint (for example by the economic liberals of Kiel University 
– see Klodt, Stehn et al. 1994) that Germany was unable to attract FDI proves to have 
been completely unfounded. The reality was that German proprietors were unwilling 
to sell – there was always a big potential market for German industrial assets and the 
notion that international investors were shunning Germany was simply a moral panic. 
UNCTAD reports that in 2007, Germany received $50 billion in FDI inflows – still 
behind the UK, France and Spain, but ahead of the other EU member states. The data 
on M&As also indicates that Germany now welcomes inward investment into major 
industrial companies. 
 
The switch in German policy and objectives came late – the change was earlier in 
France and many other EU member states. However, the transformation in Germany 
was then extremely rapid. Equity holdings ceased to be the support of long-standing 
relationships between industrial companies or between companies and banks. The 
German Monopoly Commission reported that whereas in 1996 the six biggest private 
sector banks held stakes in 75 of the largest 100 companies by 2004 this had been 
reduced to 30. Over the same period the total number of cross-holdings among the 
100 largest companies fell from 51 to 28 and the number of enterprises (including the 
banks) possessing such stakes from 39 to 17 (Deutscher Bundestag 2006). 
 
The motives behind the switch may vary, but there was general agreement across 
business and political leaderships that it was necessary. The big corporations had 
always found some aspects of their dependence on domestic banks irksome – they had 
begun to emancipate themselves from this tutelage as early as the 1970s. As they 
became more multinational and developed their external relations dense financial 
relations with other German companies may have come to seem more of an 
encumbrance than an advantage. The big banks themselves were clearly pursuing 
global strategies, sometimes in a reckless manner. The political class in Germany, as 
elsewhere, did not perhaps understand the issues completely. They were certainly 
subject to intense lobbying from institutional investors both for a deregulation of 
finance and for a transfer of responsibility for pensions and other benefits from the 
state to the financial corporations (Wehlau 2009). Like the whole European political 
class, they also became persuaded that they were facing a critical competitive threat 
from a reborn US economy. These notions are discussed in the next section.    
 
 
3. Finance and the Lisbon Strategy 
 
At the end of a decade which culminated in an enormous financial crisis, it may be 
salutary to recall that the strategy (‘Lisbon agenda’) adopted at its beginning by EU 
leaderships not only had the integration and liberalisation of European finance as a 
key theme, but specified its objectives directly in terms of the reduction of 
transactions costs. The Stockholm Council of 2001 repeated its endorsement of the 
strategy: 
At Lisbon the European Council defined an ambitious strategy for 
change. A strategy to make the European Union by 2010 ‘the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of 
sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.’ 
Insisting on the ‘right regulatory environment’ it spelt out the aims of the strategy in a 
notorious phrase: 
Business and citizens in the European Union need a regulatory 
environment which is clear, effective and workable in a rapidly 
changing, global market place. This is a key element if the European 
Union is to become the cheapest and easiest place to do business in the 
world.”                                          
(European Commission 2001, emphasis in original) 
 
Subsequent events were to make it clear that cheap business is not always good 
business. 
 
The Lisbon strategy was adopted at the height of the ‘new economy’ euphoria in the 
US. The recent performance of the US economy seemed to have put an end to the 
long catch-up by EU countries. The rapid deployment of new technologies was seen 
as the basis for this reversal: the role of macroeconomic policies in sustaining US 
development, on the other hand, was not considered. In the EU, the solution for 
unemployment is never higher demand but always “structural reforms” of the labour 
market; the fact that three decades of such reforms have not reduced unemployment 
only proves that we need a lot more of them. 
 
In retrospect the obsession with US productivity growth seems to have been 
something of a moral panic. The aggregate data on labour productivity trends 
concealed two important factors in the comparison of EU and US data. 
 
Firstly, the surge in US productivity was heavily concentrated on a few sectors. The 
huge productivity lead enjoyed by the US in retail distribution, for example, hardly 
seems to provide grounds for alarm among the Europeans.  Secondly, the 
deterioration of European performance relative to that in the US is by no means EU-
wide. A comprehensive study by O’Mahoney and van Ark (2003) showed that, on the 
contrary, it could be attributed to two countries, Germany and Italy, ‘with Germany 
about twice as important as Italy.’  
 
Thus, there was little evidence of a Europe-wide problem. Nevertheless, Europe-wide 
institutional and policy reform was the solution. For example, the Sapir (2003) report, 
giving a first assessment of the launch of the Lisbon agenda, prescribed as follows:  
The main reason for disappointing growth in the EU is quite clear. During 
the past decades, the economy has been confronted by a series of long-lasting 
shocks – the information technology revolution, German re-unification, the 
opening up to the new market economies of central and eastern Europe, globalisation 
– which called for new organisational forms of production. The situation 
demanded less vertically integrated firms, greater mobility within and across 
firms, greater flexibility of labour markets, greater reliance on market finance 
and higher investment in both R&D and higher education. In other words, this 
required massive change in economic institutions and organisations, which has 
not yet occurred on a large scale in Europe.  
(Sapir 2003: 123)      
 
In fact, the ‘disappointing’ growth could also be attributed very plausibly to the long 
period of restrictive macroeconomic policies leading up to monetary unification, but 
this is not an acceptable thought in the EU. It remains the case, however, that US 
macroeconomic policies have been much more committed to growth and much less 
committed to price stability than have EU policies over the last three decades. 
 
On the perceived gap, Joseph Stiglitz has recently commented: 
Flawed statistics may also lead us to make incorrect inferences. In the years 
preceding the crisis, many in Europe, focusing on America’s higher rates of GDP 
growth, were drawn to the US model. Had they focused on metrics such as median 
income – providing a better picture of what is happening to most Americans – or 
made corrections for the increased indebtedness of households and the country as a 
whole, their enthusiasm might have been more muted.  
(‘Towards a Better Measure of Well-Being’, Financial Times 13th September 2009) 
 
On these somewhat flimsy foundations, the Lisbon agenda raised a comprehensive 
programme of institutional change. Finance was central to the agenda. It was thought 
that the more fluid and liquid US financial system, with its greater reliance on security 
markets, was a key factor behind its productivity performance. Europe should respond 
by integrating its capital markets and by removing administrative and legal obstacles 
to security trading. These measures would overcome the fragmentation and 
inadequate capitalisation of European equity markets. At the same time portfolio 
restrictions on pension funds should be removed: ‘if these funds in other member 
states were to reach the level achieved in the Netherlands, five trillion euro could be 
placed on EU capital markets’ (European Commission 2000). 
  
No argument will be made here against the integration of European financial markets 
as such. On the one hand, the often-vaunted precision of certain European financial 
structures and practices (the local banks of the Italian industrial districts, the role of 
the banks in German industrial investment) was based on specific national or regional 
affinities and this prevented these systems from either combining their forces or 
expanding beyond their home bases. On the other hand globalisation trends in the 
world economy were supporting a massive expansion of the US financial system and 
it was important to meet this challenge. If the Europeans failed to build big liquid 
capital markets the consequence would be to drive every issuer and investor on the 
planet into the North American ones (Grahl 2001). Such an outcome would not 
necessarily disadvantage the Europeans but it could mean that, as specialised financial 
functions were outsourced to US markets and corporations, the EU would lose 
influence over the evolution of the global system. There could also be a loss of 
income if Europe lost market share in a sector characterised by considerable market 
power and the associated profitability. 
 
Nevertheless, although the integration objective was very reasonable, the way it was 
pursued (with D.-G. Internal Market leading the Commission’s drive towards unified 
financial markets) was much less so. The goal of the strategy became the simple 
reduction of transactions costs to the exclusion of virtually all other considerations 
and several public goods essential to the effective functioning of the financial sector 
were completely neglected. The financial integration strategy is explored in the next 
section.   
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
4. The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) 
 
The Financial Services Action Plan (together with the Risk Capital Action Plan which 
had less far-reaching legislative implications) was adopted before the Lisbon Agenda 
but became a key components of it. Its goal was to remove regulatory differences 
which inhibited the free movement of capital. However, unlike previous moves 
towards more integrated finance, the focus this time was on security markets rather 
than banking.   
 
Market-led integration, seen as essentially a matter of reducing regulatory restrictions 
and lowering transactions costs was pursued to the neglect of all the public goods that 
an effective financial system requires if it is to serve the interests of its users rather 
than merely those of the financial sector. Three examples of such public goods will be 
given: consumer protection, social cohesion and financial stability. It is easy to show 
that the Commission, in its breakneck pursuit of integration at any cost, neglected all 
three. 
 
As regards the protection of retail users of financial services – whether households or 
small businesses – the Commission virtually ignored their interests until the 
legislative programme of the FSAP was nearly completed. Their preferred 
interlocutors were always the financial corporations and the regulators. When, the 
users of financial services were finally consulted, they were very critical of the 
deregulatory tendency of the Commission’s drive for integration. They saw little 
benefit in the more open markets that were promoted but many dangers in the 
downward levelling of regulatory standards (FIN-USE Forum 2004). They made a 
common sense defence of rules, such as those, for example, ‘to protect the elderly 
against fraudulent products.’ Ironically, the critique extended to terminology: for the 
Commission and the corporation ‘home-country control’ meant regulation from the 
country where the corporation was based. The users wanted to turn this round: home 
regulation should mean the application of the regulatory regime of the consumer’s 
home country, what the providing corporation might call ‘host’ country control. 
 
One alarming aspect of the Commission’s approach was its attack on what was called 
‘gold-plating,’ that is, the application of regulatory standards higher than those 
specified in EU laws. Now this has always been possible in the EU. Any member 
country is entitled to apply more stringent standards than the EU – whether this be in 
employment law, environmental protection or consumer protection. Obviously such 
higher standards can be a barrier to trade and thus slow down integration, but they do 
ensure that when integration does take place it is at a high level. In the realm of 
finance, it was argued, uniform rules were so important that member states should not 
aim for higher protection for their own citizens. 
 
(The supposed benefits from financial integration are obscure. From the point of view 
taken here there may well be an important political-economic benefit in terms of 
autonomy and the ability to influence the shape of global financial systems. The 
Commission’s lamentable attempts to show big gains in terms of GDP from financial 
integration depend on a handful of complex economic studies. These did indeed show 
am impressive boost to growth from integration. The studies deploy state of the art 
econometrics and heroic assumptions – the claimed benefits from integration 
invariably depend on the latter. See Block and Grahl (2009.) 
 
The Commission’s objectives, in pushing towards integrated security markets was to 
replicate certain aspects of the US financial system. There is no doubt that the 
member state with a financial system most closely resembling the American is the 
UK, which therefore stands as something of a model for the FSAP. Now there is no 
doubt that, in terms of the interests of retail users of finance, the British model leaves 
a great deal to be desired. A series of scandals and malpractices – mis-selling of 
pensions, excessive bank charges, over-pricing of payment insurance – have 
undermined public confidence in the sector. For examples of the contemptuous way in 
which the bureaucracies of the banks and institutional investors treat consumers, one 
need only glance at the Personal Finance section of any newspaper. More systematic 
critiques have come from sector insiders in the Myners (2001) Report on institutional 
investment and the Sandler (2002) Report on Medium-Term Savings, and from a 
series of investigations carried out by the House of Commons Treasury Select 
Committee under the chairmanship of John McFall. At no point prior to the outbreak 
of crisis in 2008 did the Directorate-General for the Internal Market, as the section of 
the Commission responsible for the FSAP, express any concern about the retail users 
of the more integrated financial sector – on the contrary, their concern was that too 
much consumer protection would slow things down.  
 
A second public good potentially affected by the FSAP was the European Social 
Model itself – although this is always mentioned with the utmost solicitude in 
Commission documents, it was clearly instrumentalised in the Lisbon strategy; only 
growth could guarantee the continuation of the Social Model, even though that 
growth, in reality was pursued by methods which were fundamentally antagonistic to 
the model. In theory, social protection could expand employment and reinforce 
external competitiveness (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
In practice, the FSAP and the financial transformation at which it aimed posed clear 
threats to European Social Models. These concerned both social protection and 
employment relations. The case of pensions can illustrate the first: the withdrawal of 
pay-as-you-go public pension provision and the resulting substitution of security-
based marketed pensions was clearly a goal of the Commission. Such a switch can 
give a big stimulus to the securities markets even though there is abundant evidence 
that market-based pensions are more expensive, more risky and much more unequally 
distributed than public sector ones. The expression, ‘modernisation of social security,’ 
in the parlance of the Commission was essentially code for this privatisation. 
However, after the equity market crash in 2001, this ambition seems to have been 
modified. The threat posed by population ageing was still stressed but now the 
appropriate response was seen as the pre-funding of public provision by large fiscal 
surpluses rather than the exposure of individual households to the vagaries of the 
financial markets. 
 
The dangers to European employment relations can be illustrated by the 
Commission’s drive to liberalise mergers and takeovers. The increased salience of 
security markets tended to make shareholders more exiguous, as regards both their 
rewards and the organisation of the business enterprises in which they had invested. 
The Commission, again through D.-G. Internal Market, showed its commitment to the 
ideology of shareholder value by an attempt to deregulate takeovers. The proposed 
directive would have made hostile takeovers much easier than they were even in the 
US, and with no safeguards at all for employees. It was defeated in the European 
Parliament in a tied vote. This commitment to the power of capital markets is hard to 
reconcile with the values of the European Social Model. 
 
Another important public good, and one very closely associated with the detailed 
functioning of financial systems, is of course financial stability itself. We have the 
testimony of no less a figure than Alexandre Lamfalussy, former head of the Bank for 
International Settlements, as to the insouciance with which the Commission regarded 
the question. Lamfalussy was actually called in to rescue the FSAP when it became 
mired in legislative complexities. His committee recommended a simplified process, 
where only framework regulations were enacted by the European Council and 
Parliament with specific regulations devolved to committees of member state 
regulators and officials. Without this procedural change the programme would have 
been delayed and its legislation would have been less effective. 
 
The draft report from the Lamfalussy committee stated, ‘…greater efficiency does not 
necessarily go hand in hand with enhanced stability….Increased integration of 
securities markets entails more interconnection between financial intermediaries on a 
cross-border basis, increasing their exposure to common shocks….there is an urgent 
need to strengthen cooperation at the European level between financial market 
regulators and the institutions in charge of micro and macro prudential regulation.’ In 
the Commission’s response, ‘It was politely but firmly suggested that we drop the 
subject’ (Lamfalussy 2003). 
 
Thus the Lisbon Strategy’s focus on lowering transactions costs was no exaggeration; 
the Commission was ready to sacrifice every significant public good in order to 
establish integrated securities markets with the lowest possible dealing costs. Only the 
outbreak of massive crisis in 2008 led to any reconsideration of that position.  
 
 
5. Mortgages – an embarrassing proposal 
 
The shallow and mechanical approach to financial policy in the Commission is well 
illustrated by its abortive initiative on mortgages. When the legislative programme of 
the FSAP, designed primarily to integrate wholesale securities markets, was virtually 
complete, D.-G. Internal Market began to look for new market integration projects. It 
published a Green Paper to press for integration of the mortgage market (European 
Commission 2005)  
 
American practice was in the background here. One example was the view that with 
improved ‘risk assessment’, the risk capital required in the mortgage sector could be 
reduced (p11). Another was the belief that a big secondary market in mortgages was 
the way forward: ‘Many….. express the view that the further integration of the EU 
mortgage markets could be considerably enhanced by the emergence of a pan-
European funding market’ (p13). There is no hint in this document that a continent-
wide secondary market in mortgages might pose certain informational difficulties and 
the word, ‘stability’ does not appear in the Green Paper.  
 
The usual tame contract economists were hired to give their blessing to this fatuous 
proposal. Their report (London Economics 2005) sang the praises of the US system, 
including its sub-prime component:  
              US experience suggests that –  
• Legal or other restrictions to banks’ geographical expansions will 
reduce the efficiency of the mortgage-lending industry. 
• Steps to create a single EU mortgage market would increase incentives 
to develop automated systems to process loan applications, which 
would reduce origination costs. 
• Removing restrictions on maximum mortgage interest rates would 
allow a subprime mortgage market to develop, thus expanding total 
mortgage lending.                                      (London Economics:168, emphasis added) 
 
The long processes of development which have adjusted housing markets in different 
member countries to their specific social conditions and social priorities mean nothing 
to the officials of D.-G. Internal Market, who would sweep everything aside to build 
another, quite pointless, pan-European market. As late as February 2007, the 
mortgage proposal was still being promoted, but by the time of the White Paper 
(European Commission 2007) at the end of the year there were signs of  a reappraisal. 
The White Paper made the breath-taking assertion that ‘recent events in global 
mortgage markets have confirmed the pertinence of the approach proposed’ (p10). Of 
course, the opposite is the truth – the whole D.-G. Internal Market argument was 
based on the supposed desirability of more product diversity, although product 
diversity was a key factor making US mortgage-backed securities opaque and risky. 
 
In 2008, the theme of mortgage market integration has been quietly dropped – one has 
to look very hard to find it on the Commission’s web-site. 
 
 
6. Huge Leverage of European Banks 
 
A press release from D.-G. Internal Market and Services (27/2/2008) asserts that 
European banks are well capitalised: ‘The origin of the current financial turmoil came 
from the US sub-prime mortgage sector and a large portion of the European financial 
sector is not directly affected by the turmoil at this stage. Where financial institutions 
have sizeable direct exposures to the US sub-prime market, or indirect exposures 
through structured products, the affected entities have well diversified portfolios and 
large capital buffers.’ 
It seems that this is simply not the case. Daniel Gros and Stefano Micosi  report that, 
‘the dozen largest European banks have now on average an overall leverage ratio 
(shareholder equity to total assets) of 35, compared to less than 20 for the largest US 
banks.’ These economists recognise that the leverage numbers reported to regulators 
are much lower, but they explain this by the ‘massive in-house investment banking 
operations of European banks’ which ‘are not subject to any regulatory capital 
requirement.’ They give the following figures for the leverage ratios of European 
banks as of 30th June 2008: UBS, 46.9; ING 48.8; Barclays, 61.3; Crédit Agricole, 
40.4, Deutsche (2007) 52.5. (Gros & Micossi 2008).  
This exceptionally high leverage translates into particularly high exposures to ‘toxic’ 
assets. Wolfgang Münchau of the Financial Times, reacting to a recent IMF stability 
report, emphasised both the scale of these exposures and the fact that they had still not 
been written down by the banks concerned: 
The most shocking news from last week’s excellent Global Financial Stability Report 
from the International Monetary Fund was not the headline estimate of total bad 
assets. That number stands at $4,100bn (£2,800bn, €3,000bn) and will almost 
certainly be revised upwards. Much more shocking was that the lion’s share of these 
assets belong to European, not North American, banks. Of the total $4,100bn, the 
global banking system accounts for $2,800bn. Of that, a little over half – $1,426bn – 
is sitting in European banks, while US banks account for only $1,050bn. 
Even worse, European banks have written down much less than American ones. 
According to Reuters, the US and European banking and insurance sector has so far 
written down $740bn. More than 70 per cent of the write-downs come from the US. 
The eurozone’s share has been an appalling 14 per cent. 
Another statistic from the IMF report: to recapitalise the banking system to reach 
capital ratios that prevailed in the mid-1990s, capital injections of $275bn would be 
required for US banks, and a whopping $500bn for European banks. 
You get the picture. All these data tell us that Europe has both the biggest problem 
and has made the least progress. 
Financial Times, 26th April 2009 
Of course the financial crisis as such is not directly a European phenomenon – it 
developed in the US mortgage market  and is related to imbalances in the US 
economy – both in terms of the current account and of the distribution of income. But 
the Lisbon Strategy, with its breakneck rush to build integrated security markets and 
its single-minded focus on the lowest possible transactions costs, sowed the wind for 
the EU financial sector.  
 
7. Tensions in the Eurozone 
The present article centres on financial developments and cannot provide an extensive 
analysis of macroeconomic developments. Nevertheless, it seems useful to establish 
two connections between the financial crisis and the problems of European, and 
especially Eurozone macroeconomic policy. On the one hand, there are strong internal 
and external arguments for a macroeconomic expansion in Europe, but any such 
project is blocked by the internal tensions of the zone.  Secondly, it is now clear that 
even the limited growth achieved in the decade of the Lisbon strategy was to a great 
extent illusory: only real estate bubbles and other forms of precarious credit expansion 
allowed some member states to record relatively rapid output growth. The basic 
weaknesses of the European Monetary Union, as critical commentators have said all 
along, do in fact prevent balanced economic progress by making it impossible to 
either compensate for or correct asymmetric developments in the member countries. 
Aglietta and Berrebi (2007) even go so far as to characterise EMU as a ‘false 
monetary union.’  
 
When one considers the Eurozone in the aggregate, there are strong arguments for an 
expansionary response to the financial crisis. Unemployment in the EU has risen from 
7.0% in 2008 to 9.8% in 2010 with no improvement forecast for 2011. For the 
Eurozone the rise over the same period has been from 7.5% to 10.3%. External factors 
also suggest an expansion: the US has to undertake a considerable correction of its 
current account which is certain to reduce demand in the global economy; the 
Eurozone is well placed to run a current account deficit and this would provide the 
most favourable context for an general reduction of imbalances. There would be no 
threat to the euro. On the contrary, standard Mundell-Fleming reasoning suggests that 
such an expansion might even strengthen the euro.  
 
However, the institutional weaknesses of the Eurozone, which has neither a budgetary 
policy nor an external policy, and the extremely aggressive policy of Germany rule 
out such an outcome. 
 
Table 1 about here  
 
As Table 1 illustrates, there has hardly been severe wage inflation in the Eurozone 
over the first decade of the new century. But wage repression in Germany has 
nevertheless been so severe as to generate severe competitiveness problems for 
several countries using the euro. The Netherlands and Austria, despite aggregate wage 
growth more rapid than in Germany, have managed to maintain competitiveness, 
presumably by keeping a very careful eye on the price of tradable goods and services. 
In several other countries, however, the current account has deteriorated rapidly. 
 
As can be seen, the consequence is to rule out any general expansion – only a 
reduction in the existing imbalances would make that possible. In fact there is no 
other means of correction for the deficit countries except simple deflation – as the 
Irish, now to be followed by the Greeks, have already shown. (The cumulative decline 
in GDP in Ireland between 2008 and 2010 was 17%.)  
Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 
Twice before in the era since the second world war, the extremism of German 
macroeconomic policy has led to international economic disruption. In both cases the 
consequences were eventually adverse not only for Germany’s partners but for 
Germany itself. One of these episodes is well known – the crisis of the EMS in 1992 
and 1993. The other European countries were trying to use a hard peg to the D-mark 
to bring down inflation. The Germans raised interest rates to 12%, making it quite 
impossible for their partners to continue this strategy even though inflation in 
Germany – supposedly the justification for the squeeze – was never above 4%. 
 
It is less well known that Germany also had a hand in the Volcker shock – the very 
costly US credit squeeze in 1979 and the early 1980s which was carried out to 
stabilise the dollar on the foreign exchanges.   
 
At the start of 2007, Germany raised its VAT rate from 16% to 19%, with a 
counterbalancing cut in social security contributions. The domestic rationale for this 
move is clear: to stimulate employment by cutting labour costs. In an international 
view the two moves, equivalent to a devaluation, might be regarded as very 
aggressive coming from a country with an enormous and growing export surplus. 
 
By the end of 2009, the European financial crisis had provoked uncontrolled fiscal 
crises, resulting in sharp contractions, in the deficit countries of the Eurozone. In spite 
of large-scale credits from the ECB and Germany the Greek situation remained 
critical because the government appeared to be insolvent. Substantial risk premia were 
being exacted from the governments with weaker economies, especially Greece. A 
new round of financial crisis was threatened for the big Northern European banks 
holding the paper of Southern European governments in the event of a default.  
 
Table 4 about here  
 
Thus, the EU failed to respond to the financial crisis in a coherent way and this failure 
released dangerous centrifugal forces in the Eurozone. And the crisis revealed in the 
cruellest way the failure of both the Lisbon strategy and the financial transformation 
which was its central component. The growth figures for the Lisbon decade, 2000-
2010, were in any case disappointing. It now appears that a substantial part of that 
growth in countries such as Ireland and Spain was illusory – the expression of 
unsustainable house price bubbles and credit expansions. 
 
 
8. Since the Crisis 
 
In his account of the sub-prime debacle, Andrew Gamble (2010) argues that ‘such 
crises are above all political events; they arise politically, they are constructed 
politically and they are resolved politically.’ This goes too far – the crash, the 
recession and the deficits are in the first instance economic phenomena. However, the 
rapid transformation of a breakdown in private finance into an assault on the public 
sphere certainly shows why one might adopt Gamble’s position.    
 
By the end of 2010, the financial crisis as such had been virtually eclipsed by a 
general fiscal crisis – or by what was presented as such. Public borrowing and public 
sector indebtedness had increased in nearly all economies, partly through massive 
state recapitalisation of troubled banks, partly through expansionary budgetary 
measures to counteract the recession which, as is nearly always the case, followed the 
financial collapse.  
 
Political leaderships, especially in the European Union, have exaggerated the 
problem. On the one hand the deterioration of public sector balance sheets was a 
logical corollary of a necessary strengthening of balance sheets in the private sector: 
deleveraging by banks and a reduction in household indebtedness are both 
preconditions for general recovery. On the other hand, there seemed to be no shortage 
of investible funds and no serious risk that public spending would crowd out private 
investment. The governments in the major economies were able to borrow very large 
sums at historically low interest rates: in November 2010 ten year bond yields were 
0.96% in Japan, 2.40% in Germany, 2.56% in the US, 2.86% in France and 3.00% in 
a Britain supposedly on the verge of insolvency. These low rates testify both to a 
surplus of savings caused by high profit rates and by a concentration of income 
growth on the richest in society and to a dearth of promising private sector investment 
opportunities. 
 
The new European Commission, however, has reacted to growing public debt with a 
consistency worthy of the Bourbons. The Stability and Growth Pact, in its view, was, 
still is and will continue to be the only correct and adequate framework for fiscal 
policy within the eurozone. In ‘2020,’ its agenda for the new decade, it writes:  
The Stability and Growth Pact provides the right framework to implement fiscal exit 
strategies and Member States are setting down such strategies in their stability and 
convergence programmes. For most countries, the onset of fiscal consolidation 
should normally occur in 2011. The process of bringing the deficits to below 3% of 
GDP should be completed, as a rule, by 2013.   (European Commission 2010: 24) 
 
An analysis by economists at the Hans Boeckler Foundation shows that the ‘Stability 
and Convergence Programmes’ formulated for eurozone countries with a view to 
bringing public sector deficits rapidly within the Stability Pact limit of 3% are, in 
many cases, absurd. Current account surpluses and deficits are assumed to diminish 
only slowly, while public sector borrowing falls very fast. The implication is a huge 
wave of borrowing by the private sector – an impossibility while banks are 
deleveraging and households struggling to reduce indebtedness (Brecht et al. 2010). 
 
This exaggeration of the general fiscal problems of the eurozone goes with a tardy and 
pusillanimous response to the severe crises in several member states, such as Ireland 
and Greece. The specific background to these crises differs from country to country 
but there are common factors at EU level: an uncontrolled widening of current 
account imbalances since the start of the century; and the finance of these imbalances 
by speculative capital flows which went into reverse after the financial collapse. 
 
An effective response to these emergencies is blocked by the refusal in Germany and 
the other surplus countries to accept any responsibility for the correction of 
imbalances or to contemplate the current and capital transfers which are the only path 
to a successful resolution.  
 
As it became clear that sovereign debt defaults by Greece and others might reignite 
financial crisis in Northern Europe and cast suspicion on the euro, some action was 
taken: the ECB began to purchase Greek government bonds, and a European 
Financial Stability Facility was established, guaranteed by eurozone members, which 
can provide up to 700 billion euros of emergency refinance. However, on German 
insistence, the terms and conditions of access to the Facility were made so restrictive 
that the countries concerned have not yet made use of it. In any case, even more 
generous credit would only delay, not remove, the threat of insolvency which hangs 
over several member states. 
 
In the financial sphere itself, there has been limited change in the EU. A draft agenda 
for reform was produced by a committee chaired by Jacques de Larosière (2009). It 
proposed both a substantive tightening of regulatory constraints across the financial 
sector and structural reforms to supervisory institutions (for a critique, see Frangakis 
and Grahl 2009). However, rapid action was only taken on the second of these themes 
– with the construction of a ‘European Framework for Safeguarding Financial 
Stability.’ This is to have two main components: to deal with systemic risks, existing 
consultative bodies are to be incorporated in a European Systemic Risk Board under 
the aegis of the ECB. Commentators have pointed out that such early warning systems 
already existed at national, European and global levels before the sub-prime crisis and 
even sometimes accurately identified the emerging risks without leading to effective 
measures of prevention. Unlike the new US Systemic Risk Council, the European 
body, when it identifies systemic risks, will not have binding powers requiring banks 
to reduce the exposures concerned. 
 
The second component of the new stability framework involves a strengthening of 
European regulatory structures. The previous, essentially intergovernmental 
committees in the fields of banking, insurance and securities markets are to be 
replaced by “authorities” with a more federal character. These are now expected to act 
in a “collegiate” way, rather than as fora for the negotiation of  individual member 
state interests. However, the actual centralisation of powers is rather limited so that it 
is not clear whether the new bodies can promulgate clear EU-wide regulations. In 
view of the record of EU financial policy discussed above this Europeanisation of 
regulatory responsibilities is a somewhat ironic outcome.  
  
It is always easier to rename and reorganise government agencies than to bring about 
significant changes in corporate practice. So far, legislation to alter the rules 
governing banks and institutional investors has made very slow progress in the EU, 
against strong lobbying from the financial sector itself. The US has already legislated 
through the Dodd-Frank Act; EU reforms lag behind and tend to be weaker than even 
the mild measures adopted in the US. 
 
By November 2010, only one substantive reform was nearing enactment, a Directive 
to regulate Alternative Investment Fund Management which deals with hedge funds 
and private equity. There has been intense lobbying, by the funds concerned, by the 
City of London and by off-shore interests to dilute the original proposals. Similar 
pressures are building up around proposed reforms of derivative trading. 
 
A detailed account of ongoing regulatory reform will not be presented here. But to 
reinforce the central theme of European subordination, the views of two recent critical 
commentators can be cited. Peter Wahl (2010, pp9-10) writes that, having encouraged 
breakneck liberalisation, the EU in the crisis found itself ‘in the situation of the 
sorcerer’s apprentice’, marginalised by crisis-management initiatives in the member 
states: ‘the fragmentation has existed before the crisis. But the crisis has brought to 
light, that the process of European integration is in a critical situation. The centrifugal 
trends are very strong at the moment, and the crisis has served as a catalyst making 
them even stronger.’ 
 
Myriam Vander Stichele, meanwhile, considers the failure to play a significant role on 
the international stage. She writes (Stichele 2010: 25-26): 
In the same way as before the financial crisis, EU decision-making on financial 
regulation is highly influenced by the political power of the financial sector, which 
results in regulations with limited impact on the industry. The EU follows the G20 
agenda at its own pace, while avoiding putting its financial industry at a disadvantage 
against the US financial industry and also being under pressure from the US not to 
disadvantage the latter’s industry! 
 
Thus recent events confirm the general argument made above. The uncritical 
acceptance by EU leaders of every aspect of the US-based global financial system, 
mean that, even in the crisis of that system, the EU is unable either to define a 
coherent strategy for its member states or to influence developments beyond its 





Although this article has been extremely critical of the financial strategies of the EU, 
it is not intended as a plea for the financial structures of the past – for German 
Hausbanken, French encadrement de credit or the local and regional financial systems 
in Greece or Italy. These systems often achieved a very precise balance between the 
interests of borrowers and lenders. But they did so only on a narrow, national or 
regional basis. Their key strength – the support they derived from specific social 
affinities – proved to be a fatal weakness in the context of a global economy: they 
were unable to expand on an international basis. Meanwhile the security-market based 
financial systems of the US may have been both less precise and less stable, but they 
were able to mobilise financial resources on a vast scale and transfer them around the 
globe. 
 
EU financial integration was a rational response to globalisation. However, the way it 
was pursued was not rational. In a climate of moral panic, European leaderships 
attempted a slavish imitation of some features of the US model (ignoring the social 
institutions which constrain financial processes even in the US to a certain extent). 
Public goods central to the European project – social protection, consumer standards 
were jettisoned in a blind rush to lower financial transactions costs. 
 
Large liquid security markets in Europe, embedded in a stable economy and subject to 
effective regulation and social control, could have drawn investors and issuers from 
around the planet and made the EU a key player in shaping the global economy. 
Instead, a decade of deregulation and speculation culminated in debacle – with 
European banks worse affected than their US counterparts and the monetary union 
itself menaced by multiple crises. A process which should have strengthened the EU’s 
political economy has ended with its complete subordination to uncontrolled forces 
within and without. Although the Lisbon strategy proved to be such a complete failure 
the new European Commission proudly asserts its complete continuity with the past 
decade. It is to be hoped, however, that the serious threats to the European project 
which arise from that failure will help to promote a change of direction.       
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Table 1: Pressure on German Wages 
 
Nominal Unit Labour Costs (euros) 
2000=100 
 Germany Eurozone 
1999 99.3 98.8 
2000 100.0 100.0 
2001 100.9 102.4 
2002 101.8 105.0 
2003 102.8 107.3 
2004 102.6 108.3 
2005 101.8 109.7 
2006 100.4 110.9 
2007 100.5 112.7 
2008 102.7 116.5 
2009 108.0 121.1 
2010 107.1 120.5 
2011 106.4 120.6 
 
 
Table 2: Persistent Surpluses 
 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP): The Surplus Pole 
 Germany Netherlands Austria 
1999 -1.2 4.2 -1.4 
2000 -1.6 6.4 -0.7 
2001 0.0 5.2 -0.8 
2002 2.2 6.1 2.7 
2003 2.1 6.1 1.7 
2004 4.8 8.6 2.2 
2005 5.2 7.5 2.2 
2006 6.6 9.0 3.0 
2007 7.9 8.5 3.4 
2008 6.6 4.2 3.6 
2009 5.0 3.9 2.5 
2010 4.8 5.9 3.1 








Table 3: Deficit Countries 
 
Current Account Balance (% of GDP): The Deficit Pole 
 Ireland Spain Greece Portugal 
1999 0.2 -2.7 -5.1 -8.9 
2000 -0.4 -4.0 -12.0 -10.7 
2001 -0.5 -4.3 -11.4 -10.4 
2002 -0.4 -3.8 -12.7 -8.5 
2003 0.8 -4.0 -12.3 -6.4 
2004 -0.1 -5.9 -10.3 -7.8 
2005 -3.3 -7.5 -11.0 -9.8 
2006 -4.3 -9.0 -12.8 -10.4 
2007 -5.1 -10.0 -14.7 -9.8 
2008 -5.2 -9.5 -13.8 -12.1 
2009 -2.9 -5.1 -13.1 -10.5 
2010 -0.9 -4.6 -10.3 -10.1 
2011 -0.6 -4.5 -8.6 -10.0 
                                                                          Source: AMECO 
 
Table 4: Financial Divergence: Ten year bond yields 
 



























Figure 1: Finance and the Lisbon Strategy 
 






















Figure 2: Social Policy and the Lisbon Strategy      
 
 
Social Policy Agenda (European Commission 2000a: 6)  
 
 
